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Abstract 
 
We evaluate the effects of aging on productivity using piece-rate earnings as a proxy for 
worker output. Our data contain the population of Finnish blue collar workers in 61  
different industries during 1990-2002. A unique feature of the data is that we can observe 
the exact hours worked on piece rates and on fixed time rates as well as earnings under 
both performance schemes. We account for the selection into piece rates by using  
rm-level changes in pay systems as instruments for the probability of working on piece 
rates. A subset of workers also receive both piece rates and time rates within the same 
quarter. For these workers, we can directly compare the age profile of hourly earnings 
under piece rates and fixed rates. The results indicate that productivity increases with age 
until age 40 after which it stays roughly constant. Wage growth is faster than productivity 
growth for young workers but after age 40 both wages and productivity grow approximately 
at the same rate. 
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1 Introduction
Population aging in the industrialized countries has raised concerns about its
effects on productivity growth.1 Underlying these concerns is the assumption
that worker productivity declines with age. Yet, a priori, it is not clear
how aging should affect worker productivity. While physical strength, some
cognitive skills and the capacity to learn deteriorate with age, accumulated
work experience may mitigate the negative effects of aging on productive
skills. How important all these factors are, and hence the net effect of aging
on productivity, is still an open question.
In this paper, we study the effect of aging on worker productivity at the
individual level using piece-rate earnings as a proxy for productivity. Unlike
fixed time-rate wages, the piece rates are directly determined by worker’s
output. We use payroll data that cover the whole blue-collar worker popu-
lation in the Finnish manufacturing industries in 1990-2002. In these data
we observe the exact earnings and the number of hours worked under both
time-rate and piece-rate compensation schemes for each worker. The panel
structure of the data allows us to follow workers over time and to examine
the changes in their hourly earnings as they get older. A subset of workers
in the data also work under both piece and fixed rate schemes, often during
the same quarter. For these workers, we can directly observe the difference
between piece-rate and time-rate earnings at the same point in time directly
and calculate the age profile of the within-worker gap between productivity
and wages.
Earlier studies on the effect of aging on productivity have followed several
stategies. In some occupations direct measures of individual productivity
are available and age-productivity profiles can be calculated in a straight-
forward way.2 Sometimes direct measures of productivity are available for
1See papers by Feyrer [2007] and Tang and MacLeod [2006] on the effects of population
aging on aggregate productivity growth in the United States and Canada, respectively.
2Oster and Hamermesh [1998] as well as Weinberg and Galenson [2005] focus on aca-
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more representative samples of workers at team level (eg. Borsch-Supan and
Weiss [2008]). Also individual wages and supervisor performance evalua-
tions have been used as productivity measures.3 More recently, the use of
linked employer-employee data has become common in the field. Authors
such as Hellerstein et al. [1999], Cre´pon et al. [2003], Ilmakunnas and Mali-
ranta [2005] as well as Dostie [2011] use firm-level information to estimate
the effect of workforce composition on the firm productivity. Most of these
studies suggest that productivity of the older workers is lower than that of
the prime-age workers.
Although these studies provide important insights on the effects of aging
on productivity, they are in many ways problematic. Direct information
on individual output is available only for few professions and the results
from these studies are hard to generalise. Supervisor evaluations could be
sufficient statistics for worker’s productivity in ideal circumstances but it is
far from clear that the supervisor’s objectively evaluate the worker’s current
productivity. Studies that estimate the effect of workforce characteristics
on firm productivity essentially assume that workers are randomly allocated
to firms. In reality, for example the average age of the workers in the firm
is likely to be endogeneous as it depends on the past firing and hiring rates
which may be related to profitability of the firm or productivity of its workers.
The approach chosen in this paper bears some similarities to the early
work by Lazear and Moore [1984] who use self-employment earnings as a
proxy for productivity and Lazear [2000] study that is based on data from a
single firm. In our study we measure productivity by piece rates using data
that cover a whole industrial sector which has several advantages. First, the
data that we use contain information on workers employed in a wide variety of
demics; Galenson and Jensen [2001] study the careers of a number of great painters; Fair
[1994] and Van Ours [2009] study of the age-productivity profiles of track and field athletes.
3Influential early studies by Medoff and Abraham [1980] and Medoff and Abraham
[1981] show that worker’s job tenure is negatively associated with supervisor evaluations.
Flabbi and Ichino [2001] repliacte the analysis in a different context with very similar
results.
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tasks and industries and is therefore more representative than studies based
on narrowly defined occupations or single firms. Second, piece rates provide
us a metric that makes productivity comparable across tasks and allows us
to compare age-productivity profiles in different tasks and industries. Third,
unlike in the case of average hourly earnings or supervisor performance eval-
uations, the standard agency problems are absent under piece rates that are
directly determined by worker’s individual output. Finally, as we can focus
on output at indivudual level, we do not have to assume that firms hire and
fire workers of different ages randomly.
The use of piece rates as a productivity proxy naturally also has its
caveats. First, the piece rates are not used in all industries and tasks. In
our data, we also observe a clear declining trend in the use of piece rates.
Yet, more problematic is that even within tasks and industries, piece-rate
assignments are not randomly allocated to workers. Our solution to this dif-
ficult problem is to use year to year variation in the use of piece rates at the
firm level to construct selectivity corrected estimates for the effect of age on
piece-rate earnings.
Our results show that worker productivity increases until age 40 after
which there is only a modest decline in the years immediately before retire-
ment. The wages of young workers increase more rapidly than their produc-
tivity so that while young workers are initailly ”cheaper” in terms of their
wage productivity gap, this advantage disappears by the age 45 after which
productivity and wages follow the same age profile.
2 Data
We use data from the wage records of the Confederation of Finnish Industry
and Employers. For the Finnish manufacturing industries, the data cover
virtually all large firms and all workers in these firms. We focus on blue-
collar workers and have data on the entire blue-collar population from 1990
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to 2002.
Each observation in the data contains the hours worked and earnings
within the last quarter of a calendar year. After eliminating some observa-
tions due to missing information and trimming observations that exceed or
are below the annual earnings median by a factor 10 to remove outliers due
to coding errors, we have a panel of 2,737,096 employee-year observations
representing 545,872 workers from 5,105 firms in 61 industries. The average
number of years of obervations per worker is 8.47.
2.1 Payment schemes in Finnish manufacturing
The Finnish manufacturing industries are unionized and the general guide-
lines on wage determination are defined in the industry-level collective agree-
ments. These collective agreements allow the firms to choose from three dif-
ferent contracts: fixed rates, piece rates and reward rates. The spirit of the
collective agreement is that the payment method should be determined by
the characteristics of the tasks performed by the worker not by the charac-
teristics of the worker.
On time rates, workers are paid fixed hourly wages although contracts do
have provisions for discretionary bonuses. For example in the technology in-
dustry, which employs the largest number of workers, this bonus can amount
to 2%-17% of the job-specific minimum wage. The final level of the time
rates is deterimined at the local level so that there is considerable variation
across workers and firms in time rate wages even within detailed occupations.
On piece rates, workers are paid purely based on individual output. The
collective agreement indicates that piece rates should be used on clearly spec-
ified task assignments, and that payment should be based on output measures
such as units, kilograms or meters produced. The union contracts contain
detailed task descriptions and unit prices in various tasks. General wage
increases typically affect directly these task-specific rewards. Piece rates are
currently the least common payment scheme in the industry. Only 15 %
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(17% for women) of total hours worked are rewarded based on piece rates.
The final compensation contract in the Finnish manufacturing industries
is reward rates, which are a mix of piece rates and fixed rates, and could
also include a team-based bonus. Unfortunately, the payroll records from
the Confederation do not separate the part of reward-rate pay that is based
on output from the part that is fixed. For this reason, reward rate earnings
are omitted from the analysis.
2.2 The use of piece rates
A unique feature in these data is that we can observe the exact number of
hours that the individual has worked under each payment scheme in each
year. This information reveals that 377,527 (69%) workers in our data never
received piece rates. Only 15,805 (3%) worked exclusively on piece-rate con-
tracts. Altogether 148,901 (27%) workers have both piece-rate and time-rate
earnings at least once during our 13-year observation period. Interestingly
135,128 of these workers share their hours between piece and time rates
within the same quarter at some point in their career. Typically, workers are
on piece rate for a specific task (e.g. building a brick wall) and once the task
is completed they work on time rates until the next piece rate assignement
is measured and priced.
Table 1 gives the descriptives statistics on workers who work positive
number of hours on piece rates and on workers who have no piece-rate earn-
ings. Data is pooled over 13 years and the unit of observation is a person-year
combination. As shown in the table piece rates earnings of men are on aver-
age 27 (7 for women) percent higher than time rate earnings. Also time-rate
earnings are higher for those earning also piece rates indicating that the
piece-rate workers are not a randomly selected group of workers. Average
age and education of piece-rate workers is not very different from other work-
ers. Men working on piece rates have on average shorter tenure than other
men, among women the piece-rate workers have longer tenure.
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In line with previous evidence in Pekkarinen and Riddell [2008] the vari-
ation in the use of piece rates is mainly due to differences across firms. An
average piece-rate worker is employed in a firm where 33 % of co-workers
also receive piece rates while the corresponding figure for time-rate workers
is only 5%. Piece rates are also more extensively used smaller firms. In addi-
tion, the use of piece rates varies across industries. Most piece-rate workers
are employed in technology, sawmill, construction and clothing industries.
3 Age-profile of piece vs. time rate earnings
Figure 1 plots the age profiles of hourly piece-rate earnings for men and
women in the whole manufacturing worker population during 1990-2002.
Both profiles are derived from OLS-regressions where variation over time
is controlled for by including the year dummies and variation across firms by
including the firm fixed-effects. For comparison, we also plot the age profile
of time-rate wages, separately for workers who also have piece-rate earnings
in and for workers who are never observed on piece rates.
Both time rate and piece rate earnings follow familiar concave age profiles.
They increase rapidly with age up to about age 30 and reach their maximum
around age 45. However, the age-profile of piece rate earnings is flatter than
that of time rate wages, particularly among women. Tables 2a and 2b report
summary statistics for the growth of time and piece rates within specified
age range. For men piece rates (time rates) increase by 0.03 (0.06) log points
between ages 30 and 45 and then decline by 0.03 (0.01) log points between
ages 45 and 60. For women piece rates (time rates) only increase by 0.01 %
(0.03) between ages 30 and 45 and decline by 0.01 between ages 45 and 60
where as time rates do not decline at all. In addition, piece rate earnings
are higher than time rate earnings at all ages. Time-rate earnigs are slightly
higher for those who also work on piece rates than for those who always work
on time rates, indicating positive selectivity into piece-rate work. We deal
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with this selection problem in the following section.
4 Effect of age on productivity
4.1 Method
Our goal is to estimate the effect of age on individual productivity, proxied
by piece-rate earnings, based on the following equation:
log(wpieceit ) = αi+Φ
piece
k Dk(ageit)+Π
piece
t Dt(yearit)+Ω
piece
f Df (firmit)+
piece
it
(1)
where wpieceit is piece-rate compensation per hour in year t. Dk is a full set
of one-year age dummies, Dt a full set of year dummies, and Df a full set
of firm dummies. We are mainly interested in recovering unbiased estimates
for the parameter vector Φk i.e. the coefficients of the age dummies.
An obvious caveat in our approach is that those who receive piece rates are
a self-selected group that is likely to have higher productivity than average
workers.4 If selectivity were independent of age, the age - productivity profiles
could still be consistently estimated, though the results would not necessarily
be generalizable to workers who do not work on piece rates. If the selection
process is different at different ages or perhaps at the different stages of the
career, even including the worker fixed-effects would not generate unbiased
estimates for the age profiles.5 Another important reason preventing the
use of worker fixed-effects is that they would be perfectly collinear with the
age and time effects. The worker fixed-effects only vary within cohort and
identifying them separately from the time and age effects is just as hard
as identifying separately age, time and cohort effects. We could identify
4For a theoretical illustration of this point see the model in Lazear [1986].
5Technically E
(
pieceit |wpieceit > 0, αi
)
may still depend on age. Methods for coping with
selectivity problem in fixed effects models are discussed by Wooldridge [1995] but they
usually involve explicit modelling of the selectivity process and parametric corrections for
selectivity bias.
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the model by imposing parametric restrictions on the effects of time or age
but the resulting estimates would be entirely dependent on these arbitrary
restrictions.
Our approach is based on a simple selectivity correction similar to one
that would be used with cross-section data. We assume that piece-rate earn-
ings depend on age and year and may vary across firms. To identify the
model we assume that firm effects on piece-rate earnings are constant over
time and that the firm-year interactions can hence be omitted from the main
equation. Essentially we assume that firms switch from piece rates to time
rates and vice versa for reasons that are unrelated to changes in individual-
level wages or productivity. This is a similar assumption to the one used by
Lazear [2000] to estimate the effect of piece rate contracts on productivity
using data on a single firm.
Estimating several thousand firm effects and their interactions with the
year effects in a standard probit selection model is not computatonally feasi-
ble. Therefore we use the approach by Olsen [1980] and estimate the selection
equation using a linear probablity model absorbing the firm-year interactions
in a ”fixed effect”.
More formally Olsen [1980] specifies equation of interest as
yi = Xiβ + ui
and assumes that yi is observed if si = 1 where
si = 1 iff νi < Ziγ
If νi follows a uniform distribution, P (si = 1) = Ziγ, and vector γ can be
consistently estimated using the linear probability model. Under the usual
assumption that the conditional expectation of ui is a linear function of νi,
Olsen [1980] shows that
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E(yi|Xi, νi < Ziγ) = Xiβ + ρσu
√
3(Ziγ − 1) (2)
Consistent estimates for β can therefore be obtained by regressing yi on Xi
and (Ziγ̂ − 1). As in the probit selection model, the standard errors need to
be adjusted because of the generated regressor (Ziγ̂ − 1) but otherwise the
procedure is simple. In our case the vector Xi includes age, year, and firm
effects and vector Zi also the interactions between firm and year that are
excluded from Xi.
Even though the estimation of the productivity age-profile requires some-
what strong assumptions, we are able to directly estimate the age profile of
the productivity-wage gap using within worker variation in payment schemes.
As noted above some workers have both time-rate and piece rate earnings
within the same quarter. For these workers, we can simply calculate the
difference between hourly piece rate and time rate earnings and plot the age
profile of this gap.
4.2 Selectivity corrected piece rate age profiles
In figure 2 we produce selectivity-corrected estimates based on (2). In addi-
tion to displaying the age-profiles in the entire manufacturing industry, we
estimate separately the age-productivity profiles in industries with largest
numbers of piece rate workers. To aid comparison across industries all fig-
ures are normalized by ommitting the first age dummy. As the figures include
the firm effects, the differences in the earnings levels across industries are not
informative, but the slopes can be compared.
According to figure 2 selectivity correction has only a small effect on the
age-productivity profile when data on all industries is pooled together. Pro-
ductivity increases rapidly between ages twenty and thirty, but grows only
by 0.01 log points between ages 30 and 45 for both men and women. Produc-
tivity peaks at age 43 and then declines by 0.03 log points between ages 43
10
and 60 (0.01 for women). However, this aggregate age - productivity profile
hides heterogeneity across industries. In the technology industry which em-
ploys the largest number of piece rate workers the age profiles resembles the
aggregate age profile. However, in eg. construction (textiles for women) the
productivity growth between ages 30 and 40 is much stronger and the decline
after age 40 much steeper. Analysing the reasons for the across industry dif-
ferences would require additional data on tasks performed under piece rates
in different industries. A potential explanation would be that productivity
declines with age more rapidly in physically demanding tasks.
4.3 Age profile of the within worker piece rate - time
rate gap
The comparison of age-profiles of piece and time rates in figure 1 reveals
that the gap between piece rates and times rates diminishes with age. This
would suggest that younger workers are relatively ”cheaper” than prime-age
workers in the sense that the gap between their piece rate and fixed rate
wages is higher. However, this comparison is potentially confounded by age-
varying selection into piece rates in the same way than the estimates of the
age profiles.
One way to deal with this problem is use data on workers who we observe
on both time and piece rates within a single year. For these workers, we
can calculate the contemporaeus within-worker difference between the piece
rates and the time rates. Figure 3 presentes the age coefficients from the
regression where these within-worker piece-rate premiums are regressed on a
full set of age, year, and firm dummies. The results confirm the conclusion
that the gap between piece rates and time rates decreases with age. Table
3 reports the average predicted gaps within specified age range. The gap is
approximately 0.02 log points higher for young workers than it is for prime
age workers. However, figure 3 also confirms that senior workers above age 55
are not dramatically more ”expensive” than the prime age workers. Among
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the male workers the gap is slightly smaller for workers older than 50, but
this difference is small and only marginally significant. For women we do not
observe any decrease in the productivity-wage gap after age 30.
5 Conclusions
Our results indicate that aging has no dramatic effects on productivity in
tasks where worker output can be inferred from piece-rate earnings. Produc-
tivity increases rapidly up to age 30, and peaks around age 45 but declines
only sligthly after that. Younger workers paid by time-rates are relatively
cheaper than older workers compared to the productivity differences but this
gap disappears after age 40.
As productivity growth depends on innovative activities that are typi-
cally not rewarded by piece rates, it would be premature to conclude that
population aging has no impacts on aggregate productivity. Still finding
that aging has only modest impact on productivity in wide variety of tasks
should probably mitigate some concerns on the effect of population aging on
productivity.
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Figure 1: Age profiles of time rates and piece rates.
Predicted values from an OLS regression of hourly earnings on year and firm
dumies, and piece-rate indicators interacted with the age dummies.
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Figure 2: Selectivity corrected age profiles of piece rates in different industries
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics by gender and piece rate status 
Variable Men Women 
 No piece rate hours Piece rate hours No piece rate hours Piece rate hours 
Av. hourly earnings 10.30 11.16 8.63 8.69 
 (2.47) (3.40) (1.74) (1.47) 
Hourly time rate 9.84 10.32 8.26 8.37 
 (26.19) (20.95) (23.89) (19.17) 
Hourly piece rate  12.54  8.87 
  (7.85)  (2.01) 
Age 39.18 38.95 41.15 41.98 
 (10.78) (10.15) (11.20) (10.16) 
Tenure 12.04 10.26 10.07 11.10 
 (10.68) (9.71) (9.56) (9.27) 
Years of education 11.08 11.08 10.65 10.49 
 (1.54) (1.49) (1.69) (1.61) 
Firm size 1797 702 2208 679 
 (3386) (1037) (4351) (1045) 
Co-workers’ piece rate share 0.05 0.33 0.06 0.34 
 (0.13) (0.28) (0.13) (0.25) 
Four largest industries 1. Technology 1. Technology 1. Technology 1. Technology 
 N = 443,800 N = 221,629 N = 121,795 N = 61,129 
 2. Paper 2. Sawmills 2. Paper 2. Sawmills 
 N = 251,774 N = 95,591 N = 51,608 N = 30,084 
 3. Printing 3. Buliding constr. 3. Printing 3. Clothing 
 N = 69,061 N = 92,267 N = 41,815 N = 27,396 
 4. Postal Services 4. Electrical install. 4. Postal Services 4. Textile 
 N = 53,080 N = 34,386 N = 35,442 N = 21,167 
Note: Earnings are converted to the 2002 level using the consumer price index. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 2a. Summary statistics of wage growth by age in different payment schemes. Men. 
Age range Time rates Time rates Piece rates 
 Time rate workers Piece rate workers  
19-30 0.245 0.221 0.185 
30-45 0.057 0.043 0.032 
45-60 -0.01 -0.006 -0.028 
Note: Cells report the accumulated predicted wage growth within the age range. Predicted growth is calculated from coefficients of a 
regression where log time and piece rate wages are regressed on age, year, and a full set of firm dummies. In column 1, only data on 
those workers who work exclusively time rates are used. In column 3, only data on those workers who also work a positive number 
of piece rates are used. 
 
Table 2b. Summary statistics of wage growth by age in different payment schemes. Women 
Age range Time rates Time rates Piece rates 
 Time rate workers Piece rate workers  
19-30 0.125 0.117 0.068 
30-45 0.033 0.028 0.013 
45-60 0.000 -0.011 -0.007 
Note: Cells report the accumulated predicted wage growth within the age range. Predicted growth is calculated from coefficients of a 
regression where log time and piece rate wages are regressed on age, year, and a full set of firm dummies. In column 1, only data on 
those workers who work exclusively time rates are used. In column 3, only data on those workers who also work a positive number 
of piece rates are used. 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics of the within worker gap between piece and time rates 
Age range Men Women 
19-30 0.247 0.110 
30-45 0.223 0.095 
45-60 0.207 0.091 
Note: Cells report the accumulated the average predicted within work gap between log piece and time rates within the age range. 
Predicted gaps are  calculated from coefficients of a regression where within worker log gap is regressed on age, year, and a full set 
of firm dummies. 
 
  
APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Table A1. Age profiles of time rate and piece rate wages, men. 
 Time rates Time rates Piece rates 
 Time-rate workers Piece-rate workers Piece-rate workers 
Age Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
19 -0.282 0.002 -0.262 0.003 -0.212 0.005 
20 -0.242 0.002 -0.227 0.003 -0.192 0.004 
21 -0.209 0.001 -0.188 0.002 -0.146 0.004 
22 -0.175 0.001 -0.150 0.002 -0.121 0.003 
23 -0.148 0.001 -0.123 0.002 -0.099 0.003 
24 -0.124 0.001 -0.101 0.002 -0.075 0.003 
25 -0.101 0.001 -0.083 0.002 -0.068 0.003 
26 -0.086 0.001 -0.072 0.002 -0.055 0.003 
27 -0.071 0.001 -0.058 0.002 -0.043 0.003 
28 -0.061 0.001 -0.047 0.002 -0.040 0.003 
29 -0.050 0.001 -0.042 0.002 -0.034 0.003 
30 -0.040 0.001 -0.037 0.002 -0.030 0.003 
31 -0.032 0.001 -0.030 0.002 -0.027 0.003 
32 -0.024 0.001 -0.025 0.002 -0.025 0.003 
33 -0.016 0.001 -0.020 0.002 -0.018 0.003 
34 -0.012 0.001 -0.017 0.002 -0.014 0.003 
35 -0.007 0.001 -0.015 0.002 -0.017 0.003 
36 -0.003 0.001 -0.012 0.002 -0.011 0.003 
37 0.003 0.001 -0.008 0.002 -0.009 0.003 
38 0.009 0.001 -0.006 0.001 -0.003 0.003 
39 0.011 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.003 
40 Consrained to 0 Consrained to 0 Consrained to 0 
41 0.017 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 
42 0.020 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.003 
43 0.022 0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.003 
44 0.024 0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.003 
45 0.024 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.003 
46 0.027 0.001 0.011 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
47 0.027 0.001 0.010 0.002 -0.003 0.003 
48 0.029 0.001 0.011 0.002 -0.005 0.003 
49 0.028 0.001 0.011 0.002 -0.003 0.003 
50 0.025 0.001 0.011 0.002 -0.008 0.003 
51 0.025 0.001 0.008 0.002 -0.002 0.003 
52 0.023 0.001 0.007 0.002 -0.004 0.003 
53 0.021 0.001 0.005 0.002 -0.008 0.003 
54 0.020 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.012 0.004 
55 0.020 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.012 0.004 
56 0.020 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.011 0.004 
57 0.016 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.018 0.004 
58 0.016 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.015 0.005 
59 0.014 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.013 0.006 
60 0.014 0.002 -0.003 0.004 -0.027 0.006 
61 0.010 0.003 -0.005 0.005 -0.012 0.008 
62 0.005 0.003 -0.005 0.006 -0.015 0.009 
63 -0.006 0.004 -0.016 0.007 -0.029 0.010 
64 -0.007 0.004 -0.002 0.008 -0.040 0.012 
Constant 2.328 0.001 2.370 0.001 2.546 0.002 
Note: Coefficients are OLS estimates of age dummies from a regression of log hourly earnings on year and firm dummies and age 
interacted with indicators of i) time-rate pay for those working only on time rates, ii) time-rate pay for those earning also piece rates 
and iii) piece-rate pay. Coefficient of age 40 is restricted to zero and hence the other coefficients measure the difference in hourly 
earnings to hourly earnings at age 40 under each pay system. Standard errors are clustered at the person level.   
 
 
 
  
Table A2. Age profiles of time rates and piece rates, women. 
 Time rates Time rates Piece rates 
 Time-rate workers Piece-rate workers Piece-rate workers 
Age Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
19 -0.165 0.002 -0.136 0.004 -0.075 0.004 
20 -0.145 0.002 -0.099 0.004 -0.052 0.004 
21 -0.131 0.002 -0.087 0.004 -0.044 0.004 
22 -0.119 0.002 -0.067 0.003 -0.036 0.003 
23 -0.099 0.002 -0.057 0.003 -0.030 0.003 
24 -0.087 0.002 -0.045 0.003 -0.019 0.003 
25 -0.078 0.002 -0.034 0.003 -0.016 0.003 
26 -0.069 0.002 -0.030 0.003 -0.013 0.003 
27 -0.060 0.002 -0.029 0.003 -0.015 0.003 
28 -0.052 0.002 -0.022 0.003 -0.007 0.003 
29 -0.045 0.002 -0.020 0.003 -0.006 0.003 
30 -0.041 0.002 -0.019 0.003 -0.007 0.003 
31 -0.036 0.002 -0.015 0.003 -0.007 0.003 
32 -0.031 0.002 -0.014 0.003 -0.004 0.003 
33 -0.030 0.002 -0.011 0.003 -0.003 0.003 
34 -0.025 0.002 -0.008 0.002 0.000 0.003 
35 -0.023 0.002 -0.008 0.002 -0.002 0.003 
36 -0.020 0.002 -0.005 0.002 0.000 0.003 
37 -0.021 0.002 -0.005 0.002 0.000 0.002 
38 -0.018 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 
39 -0.013 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
40 Consrained to 0 Consrained to 0 Consrained to 0 
41 -0.010 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 
42 -0.008 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
43 -0.009 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 
44 -0.006 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.002 
45 -0.005 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.007 0.002 
46 -0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.002 
47 -0.005 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.002 
48 -0.005 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 
49 -0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.002 
50 -0.002 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.002 
51 -0.003 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.003 
52 -0.004 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.003 
53 -0.006 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.003 
54 -0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
55 -0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.003 
56 -0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.003 
57 -0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003 
58 -0.007 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.005 0.003 
59 -0.008 0.003 -0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.004 
60 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.004 -0.004 0.004 
61 -0.008 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.005 
62 -0.005 0.004 -0.007 0.006 -0.005 0.005 
63 -0.022 0.005 -0.012 0.007 -0.003 0.007 
64 -0.024 0.005 -0.013 0.008 -0.007 0.007 
Constant 2.097 0.001 2.116 0.002 2.195 0.002 
Note: Coefficients are OLS estimates of age dummies from a regression of log hourly earnings on year and firm dummies and age 
interacted with indicators of i) time-rate pay for those working only on time rates, ii) time-rate pay for those earning also piece rates 
and iii) piece-rate pay. Coefficient of age 40 is restricted to zero and hence the other coefficients measure the difference in hourly 
earnings to hourly earnings at age 40 under each pay system. Standard errors are clustered at the person level. 
 
 
